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Taxing Government: The Case of the Uganda Revenue Authority’s Public 
Sector Office 
 
Henry Saka, Ronald Waiswa and Jalia Kangave 
 
Summary 
 
Virtually all the literature on taxation presents it as a relationship between government and 
non-government taxpayers. And even though in practice government organisations are – or 
should be – big taxpayers, very few revenue authorities treat these organisations as a 
separate segment of taxpayers. Different categories of taxpayers behave differently and so 
need to be treated differently to best encourage their compliance. With this in mind, in 2014, 
the Uganda Revenue Authority (URA) established the Public Sector Office (PSO) as a 
separate office to manage the affairs of government ministries, departments and agencies. 
Subsequently, the duties of the office were expanded to include the management of the 
affairs of politically influential individuals. Within the first year of its operation, the PSO had 
increased revenue collections from government organisations by 194 per cent when 
compared to the previous year. The PSO is now the second largest contributor to domestic 
tax collection in Uganda, after the Large Taxpayers’ Office. Its revenue share as a 
percentage of total domestic revenue collections grew from only 5 per cent in financial year 
2014/15 to 17 per cent in 2016/17. In this paper, we examine the reasons behind 
establishing the public sector as a separate taxpayer segment. We also look into the factors 
that have enabled the success of this office. We find that the PSO’s successful performance 
is facilitated by a number of factors including having a proficient team of revenue officials; 
having the support of top URA management; collaboration and coordination with other key 
government offices; support from high-ranking government officials; and the use of ‘soft 
compliance’ strategies such as organising taxpayer workshops, making phone calls to 
relevant contact persons in government organisations and sending emails with reminders of 
due dates for filing tax returns and paying taxes.   
 
Keywords: public sector office; Uganda Revenue Authority; ministries; departments; 
agencies; taxpayers. 
 
Henry Saka is the Commissioner for Domestic Taxes at the URA. Henry has led several 
reforms at the URA including the establishment of the Public Sector Office and a High Net 
Worth Individual Unit. 
 
Ronald Waiswa is a supervisor in Research and Policy Analysis at URA’s Research, 
Planning and Development Division. He also heads research and training at Lida Africa.  
 
Jalia Kangave is a Research Fellow at the Institute of Development Studies, and Capacity 
Building Manager of the International Centre for Tax and Development (ICTD). She also 
leads the Gender and Tax programme at ICTD.  
 
  
4 
 
Contents 
 
Summary          3 
Acknowledgements         5 
Acronyms          5 
Introduction          6 
 
1 Tax administration reform in Uganda      7 
 
2  The Uganda Revenue Authority’s Public Sector Office    8 
2.1 The public sector as a taxpayer      8 
2.2 Structure of the PSO         10 
2.3 Functions of the PSO        11 
 2.3.1 Service management       11 
 2.3.2 Compliance management      11 
 
3 What made the URA adopt the PSO model?     12 
3.1 The need to improve the efficiency of the LTO    12 
3.2 Reducing complacency in smaller URA offices    13 
3.3 Improving the tax compliance of the public sector    14 
3.4 To monitor the flow of money from government to the private sector 14 
3.5 The public sector needed specialised, high-quality engagement  14 
 and service 
 
4 Achievements of the PSO         15 
4.1 Improvements in government declarations     15 
4.2 Revenue collection performance      17 
4.3 Improved tracing of transactions between government and  
 private sector contractors       18 
 4.4 Increase in compliance by politicians and other  
  influential individuals        19 
 
5 Enabling conditions for the PSO’s success     19 
 
6 Challenges faced by the PSO       20 
 
7  Conclusion          21 
 
 References          22 
 
Tables 
Table 1 PSO taxpayer register and staffing      11 
Table 2  Domestic tax collections by stations before and after PSO   13 
Table 3 Number of staff declared in monthly returns by MDAs   16 
Table 4 Domestic tax collections by tax office (in billions of Uganda Shillings) 18 
 
Figures 
Figure 1  URA taxpayer segmentation reform      8 
Figure 2 Criteria for inclusion or exclusion of government entities in PSO register 9 
Figure 3 Structure of the PSO        10 
Figure 4 Filing PAYE returns over time      15 
Figure 5 Filing withholding tax returns over time     16 
Figure 6 Annual revenue growth of public sector institutions     18 
5 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
We are greatly indebted to the Public Sector Office team at the Uganda Revenue Authority 
(particularly Monica Tumukunde, Marion Namunyolo and James Etengu) and the 
management of the Domestic Tax Department for the wealth of information they shared with 
us, which enabled the writing of this paper. We thank Mick Moore and the anonymous 
reviewers for their useful comments on previous versions of this paper. Lastly, we thank 
participants of the 2017 ICTD annual meeting in Entebbe for their feedback on an earlier 
version of this paper.  
 
 
Acronyms 
 
CAO  Chief Administrative Officer  
HNWI  High net worth individual 
IMF  International Monetary Fund 
IPPS  Integrated personnel payroll system 
LTD  Large Taxpayer Department   
LTO  Large Taxpayers’ Office 
MDA  Ministries, departments and agencies 
MTO  Medium Taxpayers’ Office 
OECD   Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development  
PAYE  Pay as you earn 
PSO   Public Sector Office 
PSST  Permanent Secretary and Secretary to the Treasury  
STO  Small Taxpayers’ Office 
TADAT Tax Administration Diagnostic Assessment Tool  
TCC  Tax clearance certificate  
TIN   Tax identification number  
UGX  Ugandan Shilling 
URA  Uganda Revenue Authority  
US$  United States Dollar  
VAT  Value added tax 
VIP  Very important person 
 
  
6 
 
Introduction 
 
‘Why does the Uganda Revenue Authority need a Public Sector Office?’ This is a question 
that URA officials are frequently asked. The short answer to that question is that government 
itself is – or should be – a big taxpayer. The long answer is provided in the discussion in this 
paper. 
 
Over the past three decades, African countries have undertaken various reforms in tax 
administration in a bid to increase revenue collection. Perhaps the most fundamental of 
these reforms is the establishment of semi-autonomous revenue authorities that are 
independent of the civil service. Previously, most revenue authorities were structured 
according to tax type: individual offices were assigned to collect a specific type of tax (Moore 
2013). This model had a number of shortcomings including: duplication of functions; high 
compliance costs for taxpayers who had liability for more than one tax type; encouraging 
unhealthy competition between tax offices; and lack of centralised information relating to 
taxpayers (OECD 2010). In a number of countries, the tax-type structure was subsequently 
replaced by a functional structure, which consists of having different units that deal with 
different functions of tax administration (such as taxpayer registration, audit and 
investigation, legal affairs, debt collection, dispute resolution and human resource 
management) (Moore 2013; Gill 2003). This newer model of tax administration has various 
advantages, including improving professionalism in revenue authorities by promoting 
specialisation; having a unified system of tax registration; more centralised access to 
taxpayer information; and enabling tax authorities to more effectively manage audits and 
debt collection (Terkper 1995; OECD 2010).  
 
In various revenue authorities, the functional model is complemented with taxpayer 
segmentation (OECD 2010; Moore 2013). Taxpayer segmentation recognises the fact that 
different categories of taxpayers have different characteristics and behave differently. Each 
may be treated differently to best encourage compliance. The most common type of 
segmentation is by size: taxpayers are divided, for example, into large, medium and small 
taxpayers (Baum, Gupta, Kimani and Tapsoba 2017). More recently, a few revenue 
authorities in African countries such as Uganda, South Africa and Mauritius have added a 
new segment of taxpayers referred to as ‘high net worth individuals’ (HNWIs) (Kangave 
Nakato, Waiswa, Nalukwago, and Lumala Zzimbe 2018).  
 
While government organisations have an obligation to pay taxes, most revenue authorities 
do not treat these organisations as a separate segment of taxpayers. Instead, the tax affairs 
of these government organisations are managed in the three ‘traditional’ taxpayer segments 
(small, medium and large). Similarly, virtually all the literature on taxation presents it as a 
relationship between government and non-government taxpayers. Yet in reality, there is a 
large intra-government dimension of taxation. In recognition of the importance of the 
government as a taxpayer, the Uganda Revenue Authority (URA) set up a separate office – 
the Public Sector Office (PSO) – to manage the tax affairs of government ministries, 
departments and agencies (MDAs). Since its establishment in 2014 the PSO has registered 
significant success. In the financial year 2015/2016, revenue collected by the PSO grew by 
194 per cent over the previous year. In 2016/17, it increased by 106 per cent. The PSO is 
now the second largest contributor to domestic tax collection in Uganda, after the Large 
Taxpayers’ Office (LTO). Its revenue share as a percentage of total domestic revenue 
collections grew from only 5 per cent in the financial year 2014/15 to 17 per cent in 2016/17.  
 
In this paper, we examine the question: to what extent does the URA’s PSO present a 
convincing case for having a separate segment for managing the taxation of public sector 
entities? Given that there are not many such specific offices for managing the taxation of 
government entities, there is hardly any published literature on these offices. This paper aims 
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to fill that gap. In the course of our research, we found out that Nigeria’s Federal Inland 
Revenue Service (FIRS) has a similar office, referred to as the Government Business Tax 
Department. The department was established in 2012 to handle the tax affairs of government 
MDAs, agencies, states and local government councils (Federal Inland Revenue Services 
2013a; Federal Inland Revenue Services 2013b). It is headed by a director and has a total of 
37 offices, covering all the states in the country and the Federal Capital Territory. Its 
responsibilities include assessment and collection of taxes, compiling databases of 
government organisations and managing the tax debts that they owe. While the Government 
Business Tax Department started its operations in early 2013, we are not aware of any 
published study on its impact or effectiveness. It seems even more appropriate, therefore, to 
have a discussion on the impact of the URA’s PSO in the hope that other revenue authorities 
can learn from its experience.  
 
The paper is divided into eight parts, with this being the introduction. Part 1 provides a brief 
background on tax administration reforms in the URA. This is followed by a discussion in Part 
2 of the structure of the URA’s PSO, including the URA’s definition of the public sector. Part 
3 contains a discussion of the reasons why the URA established the PSO. In Part 4, we 
highlight the achievements of the PSO. Part 5 discusses some of the conditions that enabled 
the PSO to achieve this success. In Part 6, we highlight the challenges faced by the PSO. 
We conclude in Part 7. 
 
 
1  Tax administration reform in Uganda 
 
Before the establishment of the URA, central government taxes were collected by the 
Ministry of Finance. In September 1991, the URA was established as a semi-autonomous 
revenue authority. The government hoped to achieve two main objectives when it 
established the URA (Kangave 2005). First, it was hoped that, by removing tax collection 
from the Ministry of Finance, the newly established revenue authority would operate with 
limited political interference. Second, by being removed from the civil service, the URA would 
be able to offer better remuneration and thereby attract and retain competent staff. These 
reforms, along with the introduction of value added tax (VAT) in 1996 and the enactment of a 
new income tax law in 1997, registered initial success. The ratio of tax collections to Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) increased from 7 per cent in 1991 to 10 per cent in 1997. 
 
From its inception, the URA regularly adjusted its organisational structure to meet changing 
demands. In the early to mid-1990s, the URA was structured along predominantly tax-type 
lines such as the Income Tax Department, Excise Department, VAT Department and 
Customs Department. Following an International Monetary Fund (IMF) review, a Large 
Taxpayer Department (LTD) was established in late 1998 (Kuteesa, Tumusiime Mutebile, 
Whitworth and Williamson 2010). This resulted in the creation of two broad categories of 
taxpayers: large taxpayers and others. The LTD was an instant success in terms of revenue 
collection. In 1999/2000, it contributed approximately 74 per cent of the domestic tax revenue 
collections. However, it was not popular with large taxpayers, who complained that they were 
being harassed; a factor that contributed to its closure in 2001 (Kuteesa et al. 2010). Several 
structural changes were made in the period between 2000 and 2004, culminating in the 
establishment of a Department of Direct Taxes, a Department of Indirect Taxes and an 
Expansion and Collection Department. The LTD that was closed in 2001 was subsumed into 
the Direct and Indirect Tax Departments (Baum et al. 2017). It was reopened in 2005 as a 
division in the Domestic Tax Department and called the Large Taxpayers’ Office (LTO) 
(Kuteesa et al. 2010).  
 
In 2004, the URA underwent a major restructuring exercise which resulted in moving away 
from a tax-type organisational structure to a function-based structure, which was 
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complemented with taxpayer segmentation (Kangave 2005). Six departments were created: 
Domestic Taxes Department, Customs and Excise Department, Board and Legal Affairs 
Department, Commissioner General’s Office, Corporate Services Department and the 
Internal Audit, Tax Investigation and Internal Affairs Department. The Domestic Taxes 
Department and the Customs and Excise Department were the two core departments in 
charge of operations. The Domestic Taxes Department was responsible for the registration, 
auditing, assessment, collection and accounting of domestic taxes. By 2009, there were 
three categories of taxpayers: large, medium and small. Later, in September 2014, the URA 
established a specialised office to deal with the public sector. This Public Sector Office has 
three main segments of taxpayers: government organisations, HNWIs1 and very important 
persons (VIPs).2  
 
Figure 1 URA taxpayer segmentation reform 
 
 
2  The URA’s Public Sector Office 
 
In this part, we define what is meant by the public sector for the URA’s purposes, document 
the structure of the PSO, and explain its functions.  
 
2.1 The public sector as a taxpayer 
 
The public sector, as defined by the URA, includes all entities that constitute the three arms 
of government, namely the executive, legislature and judiciary. This includes the office of the 
president (not to be confused with the person of the president), the parliament, central 
government ministries and local government units. Where executive authority is delegated by 
law to semi-autonomous entities (such as the URA, the Electricity Regulatory Authority and 
the Petroleum Authority of Uganda), the URA treats these as part of the public sector. 
Specific exceptions are made where entities operate in a manner similar to private business 
entities, for example, buying and selling goods or services or letting/leasing property. 
                                                          
1  See Kangave et al. 2018 for criteria defining a HNWI. 
2  VIPs consist of top government officials (such as the president, vice president, cabinet ministers, speaker of parliament, 
high-ranking judicial officers and heads of political parties and parliamentary committees) and influential figures (such as 
kingdom heads, heads of professional associations, religious leaders, influential journalists and heads of business 
associations). 
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Examples of such entities are the National Social Security Fund and the Uganda Wildlife 
Authority. In these cases, the incomes earned are usually either partially remitted to the 
Uganda Consolidated Fund3 or are not remitted at all. These exceptions are treated in the 
same manner as the URA would treat any other taxpayer. This rule also applies to limited 
companies owned by the government.  
 
By design, and to the extent that any revenues of the public entities are remitted to the 
Uganda Consolidated Fund, the entities are not subject to income tax.4 As such, their tax 
compliance relates primarily to the declaration and remission of withheld income taxes (pay 
as you earn (PAYE) for their employees, and tax withheld on supplies made to government 
by private business). For VAT, a withholding mechanism was in operation until 2006 when it 
was formally abolished. Some government entities have continued to practise withholding, 
although it is contrary to government standing orders. If public sector entities enter into 
taxable transactions of a commercial nature – for example, when local governments rent out 
commercial markets – the transactions are subject to VAT. The public sector entities are 
therefore required to register as VAT taxpayers. In a few cases, such as the National Social 
Security Fund, public sector units are also subject to corporation tax. They are treated as 
normal businesses for tax purposes and are subjected to the standard segmentation rules.  
 
Figure 2 Criteria for inclusion or exclusion of government entities in PSO register 
 
 
 
                                                          
3 The Uganda Consolidated Fund is the government account where all government revenues and funds are paid. It is 
also the account from which money is withdrawn to fund all government activities.  
4 Our analysis of records shared with us by the Ministry of Finance revealed that between 2015 and 2018, only one entity 
– the Uganda Communications Commission – made contributions to the Uganda Consolidated Fund. On average, the 
contribution in this three-year period was about 1.2 per cent of the approved government budget.  
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As at January 2018, the PSO managed a total of 996 taxpayers. 661 of these are 
government entities, while the remaining 335 are HNWIs and VIPs. Only 15 government 
entities are not managed by the PSO. 
 
Prior to the establishment of the PSO, public sector taxpayers were placed into two 
categories for tax management purposes. Government ministries, departments and agencies 
were managed by the LTO while the tax affairs of local government agencies were handled 
by the URA’s local offices in the geographical locations in which they were based. For 
example, the municipal council of Jinja town would be managed by the Jinja local tax office.  
 
2.2 Structure of the PSO 
 
The PSO is headed by a Manager, who reports to the Assistant Commissioner of 
Compliance in the Domestic Taxes Department. The office comprises three sub-divisions, 
covering: (a) ministries, departments, local governments and projects; (b) self-accounting 
entities (such as the URA), VIPs and HNWIs; and (c) enforcement and reporting. The 
enforcement and reporting division is responsible for arrears management, receipting 
payments that come through the Bank of Uganda, consolidating reports from the other sub-
divisions and performing the PSO’s general administration roles. The other two sub-divisions 
serve as client relationship managers, following up with normal flows of tax payments and 
filing, and educating taxpayers on their tax obligations.      
 
Figure 3 Structure of the PSO           
 
 
 
The PSO started operations in September 2014 as a pilot project with only seven staff 
members (a manager, a supervisor, and five officers) managing 379 public sector taxpayers 
(ministries, departments and district local governments). Between September 2014 and June 
2015, the PSO collected UGX (Ugandan Shillings) 216 billion (approximately US$ 77 
million),5 surpassing the revenue target of UGX 142 billion (approximately US$ 50 million) 
that the URA management had set for it. The results of the pilot were so impressive that the 
URA management decided to increase both the capacity and scope of the PSO. In July 
2015, VIPs, public authorities and commissions were added to the register and the staff 
                                                          
5 Using a bank of Uganda exchange rate of US$ 1 = UGX 2,823.22 for FY2014/15. This rate is used for all the 
conversions in this paper. 
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numbers were increased to 17.6 In July 2016, public universities, technical and vocational 
institutions, referral hospitals, national parks and self-accounting entities were also shifted to 
the PSO. Lastly, in January 2017, HNWIs were moved from the LTO and added to the PSO 
register. This last move was considered necessary because the URA observed that a 
number of individuals on the HNWI register were also VIPs. Of the original 117 HNWIs 
identified, for example, 21 per cent were VIPs and 11 per cent were former VIPs (Kangave et 
al. 2018). The URA also noticed that there were other similarities and overlaps between VIPs 
and HNWIs: both groups tend to be politically and economically influential, and have busy 
lifestyles. The skills required to interact with them and manage their affairs are thus quite 
similar. The addition of HNWIs to the PSO register brought the total number of taxpayers in 
the office to 981. Staff members were also increased to 26 as shown in Table 1.  
 
Table 1 PSO taxpayer register and staffing 
Taxpayer category 2014/2015 2015/2016 2016/2017 
Taxpayer register 381 666 981 
No. of PSO staff 7 17 26 
Staff to taxpayer ratio 1:55 1:39 1:38 
Source: URA databases 
 
 
2.3 Functions of the PSO 
 
The PSO has two core functions: service management (which includes taxpayer registration 
and education) and compliance management (review and enforcement of compliance). The 
two functions are in practice largely interwoven but we handle them separately here for 
discussion purposes.  
 
2.3.1 Service management 
 
The core activity of the PSO so far has been to establish and maintain an up-to-date register 
of public entities. Extensive cleaning of the existing register was undertaken, particularly as it 
relates to government projects and local government entities. Alongside the cleaning and 
expansion of this register was the need to strengthen taxpayer education. The PSO actively 
participates in government activities and meetings of various kinds to ensure that tax is 
consistently on the agenda of government agencies. PSO officials educate taxpayers on an 
ongoing basis by listening to and addressing their concerns, assisting with online compliance 
procedures and providing advice on taxpayer obligations. For VIPs and HNWIs, functions 
that are ordinarily carried out within URA premises are sometimes conducted on a client’s 
premises. Due to the nature of the taxpayers, senior management will often get involved in 
interactions with taxpayers.7 
 
2.3.2 Compliance management 
 
To a great extent, the PSO employs a soft approach to improving compliance, with the 
emphasis being placed on taxpayer education and increasing the ease of complying. 
Enforcement is usually limited to cases where audits have been carried out. Recovery 
methods emphasise engagement and high professionalism.  
 
The compliance management function examines compliance history and trends and takes 
corrective action through audit, management of arrears and enforcing collections. Key roles 
under compliance management include: 
 
                                                          
6 This includes 12 technical staff members and five support staff.  
7 For more details on the URA’s treatment of HNWIs and VIPs, see Kangave et al. 2018.  
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 Tracking government appropriations and fund releases to provide information to 
other tax offices when their clients have been paid by government. It also informs the 
Treasury Department when there are inconsistencies between the amounts filed in 
the tax returns and the funds that were released to the government entities.  
 Examining contracts between business entities and government organisations, 
including keeping track of their implementation. 
 Examining policies and laws and advising the Business Policy Division of the URA on 
possible changes. 
 
 
3  What made the URA adopt the PSO model? 
 
While there is no question about the formal legality of taxing the public sector, this is not 
always accepted in practice. And some public sector units have sufficient authority to resist. 
The public sector poses significant tax risks and leakages that need to be addressed through 
deliberate strategies. The URA chose to manage the public sector separately for the 
following combination of reasons. 
 
3.1 The need to improve the efficiency of the LTO 
 
Various assessments and external technical assistance missions had identified a number of 
inefficiencies in the LTO. For example, in 2014 and 2015, IMF missions identified high levels 
of non-compliance among large taxpayers. They found that of the 726 taxpayers on the LTO 
register, about half were making little or no revenue contributions, and less than 10 per cent 
of the taxpayers on the register contributed the bulk of the revenue collected by the LTO. The 
IMF recommended a review of the segmentation of taxpayers in the LTO and the Medium 
Taxpayers Office (MTO) to establish whether the criteria for allocating taxpayers between 
them should be adjusted. Similarly, the first Tax Administration Diagnostic Assessment Tool 
(TADAT)8 assessment carried out on the URA in 2015 identified a number of weaknesses in 
tax administration, including inaccuracies in taxpayer registration details and poorly 
structured mechanisms to identify, assess and prioritise risks. These findings and other 
internal URA assessments attributed the shortcomings in part to the lack of sufficient 
resources in the LTO and called for an increase in its technical personnel.  
 
With no funds to hire additional staff in the short term, the URA management studied options 
to reduce the administrative burden on existing staff and to further specialise the operations 
of the LTO (interview with the management of Domestic Taxes Department). The LTO 
handles large taxpayers (companies) who by their definition have complex business and tax 
arrangements, and hence it requires specialised skills that were in short supply. As of July 
2014, the LTO managed 722 taxpayers. Close to 30 per cent of these were either 
government organisations or were not large enough to be categorised as large taxpayers. 
Specifically, there were around 53 government organisations, constituting approximately 7 
per cent of the LTO population (URA databases for 2014). The nature and operations of 
these public organisations were very different from private sector businesses. Handling the 
tax affairs of the public sector entities required different tax administration skill sets such as 
knowledge of public sector management/accounting and an ability to negotiate with public 
officials. It was perceived that a focus on both extremes – private businesses engaged in 
complex tax planning on the one hand and the much less complex but severely non-
                                                          
8 The Tax Administration Diagnostic Assessment Tool (TADAT) is a tool developed by a number of international 
organisations (led by the International Monetary Fund) to assess the health of key components of a country’s tax 
administration system. It focusses on nine performance indicators: accountability and transparency, integrity of the 
registered taxpayer base, risk management, supporting voluntary compliance, timely filing of declarations, timely 
payment of taxes, accuracy of declarations, effectiveness of dispute resolution and efficient revenue management. See 
http://www.tadat.org/ 
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compliant public sector on the other hand – was stretching the resources of the LTO. The 
public sector entities were also skewing the performance of the LTO, making realistic 
analysis and design of compliance interventions difficult (URA internal report, undated). By 
June 2014, although all other taxpayers had migrated to the more efficient eTAX electronic 
system for tax declaration and payment, most payments of tax by the government were 
reflected through an older electronic cash book. Continuing use of the older system was 
causing significant revenue reconciliation challenges within the LTO.  
 
3.2 Reducing complacency in smaller URA offices  
 
URA management observed that a number of smaller URA field offices relied heavily on a 
relatively small number of public sector taxpayers to meet their revenue targets. 
Consequently, these offices did not put much effort into registering or collecting taxes from 
small taxpayers. It was perceived that removing the public sector entities from these 
jurisdictions would shift the focus to business taxpayers, particularly for purposes of 
expanding the taxpayer register. Initially, when public sector entities were removed from the 
control of the Small Taxpayer Offices (STOs), revenue collections dropped by 17 per cent in 
upcountry STOs in the financial year 2014/15 and by another 18 per cent in 2015/16. 
However, in 2016/17 their collections increased by 27 per cent. Interestingly, one of these 
upcountry stations (Pallisa) virtually collapsed after the removal of public sector taxpayers 
from its register. In 2014/15, following the removal, it collected only UGX 100,000 
(approximately US$ 35). URA management later made the decision to close it. Similarly, 
even the Kampala-based STOs registered a slump in their collections in 2015/16, followed by 
a recovery in the next year (Table 2).  
 
Table 2 Domestic tax collections by stations before and after the opening of the PSO 
Station 
DT collections (UGX billions) Growth rate (%) 
FY2013/14 FY2014/15 FY2015/16 FY2016/17 FY2014/15 FY2015/16 FY2016/17 
Kampala STOs 475 619 583 701 30% -6% 20% 
Upcountry STOs 264 220 180 228 -17% -18% 27% 
LTO 3,198 3,187 4,428 4,330 -0.4% 39% -2% 
PSO 
 
216 628 1,291 
 
194% 106% 
MTO 467 494 776 929 6% 57% 20% 
Grand total 4,404 4,736 6,595 7,479 8% 39% 13% 
Source: Authors’ computations based on URA payments databases. 
 
3.3 Improving the tax compliance of the public sector  
 
By 2014, URA management had observed that the public sector posed a range of unique 
challenges to tax administration. Tax payments by government organisations were driven by 
the frequency, or lack thereof, of government expenditure releases by the Treasury 
Department, rather than by the requirements of tax legislation. The likelihood of success of 
traditional enforcement measures was perceived to be low and the likelihood of resistance by 
the managers of these organisations was high. This created an incentive for accounting 
officers in these entities to ignore their tax obligations or to misuse the money earmarked for 
taxes by reallocating it to other unfunded needs. When tax arrears mounted, the government 
would simply waive the liabilities.   
 
There were likely two main reasons for low compliance rates in the public sector: the 
knowledge that the URA found it difficult to enforce the law; and, in some cases, ignorance or 
uncertainty about tax obligations. Some public sector units perceived tax as the role of the 
URA and believed that the URA should recruit officers to file tax returns on their behalf 
(interview with PSO team).  
 
Many entities were either not filing their tax returns at all or were filing and paying late. The 
public sector (as defined in Part 2 above) and the education sector (government schools, 
universities and technical institutions) were ranked the least compliant sectors for PAYE in a 
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2014 study conducted by the URA (URA report 2014). By October 2014, only 39 per cent of 
the PAYE returns of these public sector entities were filed on time. For tax withheld on 
business-to-government transactions, the on-time filing rate was 36 per cent (eTAX data). 
The few entities that were declaring tended to make significant errors in their declarations 
(PSO performance report 2016). Similarly, many senior government employees received 
benefits in kind which went largely untaxed. For example, contrary to the law, government 
vehicles used by these officials were considered tax free.  
 
By June 2014 the government had accumulated tax arrears of UGX 598 billion 
(approximately US$ 212 million). In the same year the URA had a record collection shortfall 
of just over UGX 400 billion (US$ 141 million), a significant portion of which was attributed to 
non-compliance by government entities. The response was for government to waive most of 
the tax outstanding from the public sector. URA management was, therefore, looking for a 
way to make government bodies more compliant in the future.  
 
3.4 To monitor the flow of money from government to the private sector 
 
The URA’s limited access to the government accounting and payments system (Integrated 
Financial Management System – IFMS) made it difficult to track transactions made between 
government and the private sector. This, compounded with the lack of other third party data 
sources (such as bank account information) was identified as a major weakness in tax 
administration. Considering that government is perhaps the biggest consumer of goods and 
services in the economy, understanding how it was spending its money would be essential to 
designing efforts to improve tax compliance. Similarly, the partial failure to collect taxes from 
businesses with government contracts was routinely raised by internal and external URA 
auditors (interview with the management of the Domestic Taxes Department).   
 
Upon investigating into why there were huge tax arrears relating to government transactions, 
the URA found that a significant number of large and medium businesses who supplied 
goods and services to government were failing to pay taxes because they had not been paid 
by the government. This was especially the case with VAT, because the liability for tax arose 
as soon as the supply was made or an invoice was issued, and yet the government would 
take months, or even years, to pay the supplier. Sometimes, large taxpayers borrowed 
money to pay tax because the government had not yet paid them and yet interest was 
accruing on their tax arrears. Establishing a PSO would help URA management to create 
awareness of this problem by regularly highlighting it.  
 
3.5 The public sector needed specialised, high-quality engagement and service  
 
The tougher enforcement methods that the URA might occasionally use against private 
sector tax defaulters, such as seizures of assets or freezing bank accounts,9 are almost 
unusable against public sector defaulters. In the few instances in which the URA attempted 
to employ these measures, they were largely ineffective (interview with the management of 
the Domestic Tax Department). It was decided that the most feasible way to improve the 
compliance of public sector entities was to customise URA services to address their 
problems and expectations, win their trust, and thus be in a position to influence their 
behaviour as taxpayers.   
  
                                                          
9 Most government entities hold bank accounts at the Bank of Uganda, which is the central bank.  
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4  Achievements of the PSO  
 
The establishment of the PSO has resulted in: 
 
 Improvements in the quality and timing of tax returns filed by the public sector. 
 Increased tax collections from the public sector. 
 The installation of a system for tracing economic transactions between government 
and the private sector. 
 Improved tax compliance on the part of influential people: politicians and those who 
are politically well connected.  
 
We discuss each of these achievements below.   
 
4.1 Improvements in government declarations 
 
Following the establishment of the PSO and efforts to sensitise public entities about their tax 
obligations, there was an increase in the number of returns filed and the number of 
government employees declared in monthly tax returns (Figure 4 and Table 3).  
 
Figure 4 Filing PAYE returns over time 
 
Source: URA databases 
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Table 3 Number of staff declared in monthly returns by ministries, departments and 
agencies 
Financial year Average no. of employees included in a 
monthly return 
Growth rate 
2015/16           31,359  45.86% 
2014/15           21,499  34.50% 
2013/14           15,984  103.05% 
2012/13             7,872  69.14% 
2011/12             4,654    
 
Despite these improvements, however, the number of late filers has remained much the 
same, and in 2017 there was even a small increase in the number of non-filers (Figures 4 
and 5). There are two explanations for this shortcoming. One is that the PSO has a limited 
budget for its outreach activities, and had to suspend them entirely for a period in late 
2015/early 2016. The other is that some of the staff of the government organisations who 
have been trained by the PSO team have been transferred elsewhere, creating a need for 
training new staff on how to handle tax obligations (interviews with PSO team).10   
 
Figure 5 Filing withholding tax returns over time 
 
Source: URA databases 
 
There has been a significant improvement in the quality of returns that are filed. Shortly after 
establishing the PSO, the number of quality returns grew by 1,023 per cent by the end of 
2015. In 2016, the quality returns submitted further increased by 56 per cent, and by 24 per 
cent in 2017 (PSO report 2017). According to the PSO, a ‘quality return’ is one where the 
taxpayer indicates the correct number of employees and suppliers in the PAYE and 
                                                          
10 This invariably suggests a lack of effective handover mechanisms in the government departments, which can be used to 
avoid business disruption.  
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withholding tax returns respectively; populates the tax identification numbers (TINs) of all 
employees and suppliers; assigns the correct TINs to the right owners; and also makes 
accurate revenue declarations (PSO report 2017, and interview with PSO staff).11 To assess 
the quality of PAYE returns, for example, the PSO officials check whether the information 
submitted is consistent with that contained in the integrated personnel payroll system (IPPS). 
They also use URA systems such as eTAX and the data warehouse eHUB, which highlight 
inconsistencies in information that has been submitted.  
 
The accuracy of returns was often compromised by a number of factors: (1) inability of 
government accounting officers to adequately glean data from the IPPS; (2) failure to convert 
this data into an Excel format that can be copied and pasted in the tax return form; and (3) an 
overall limited concern by government staff for the quality and consistency of their tax 
returns. The PSO team conducts training for government accounting officers on how to use 
the IPPS and how to file tax returns, and continuously sends filing reminders through phone 
calls, messages, emails and letters.  
 
4.2 Revenue collection performance 
 
Since 2005, the URA has run an annual taxpayer appreciation day (TPAD) where it 
recognises the most compliant taxpayers. In the financial year 2016/2017, eight taxpayers 
were given awards. Of these, five were PSO clients: district local governments. This was the 
first time that local governments had received this award (TPAD analysis report 2016/17). Let 
us look at the statistics behind this.  
 
As we have already noted, before the PSO was established, there were a number of public 
sector organisations that were not paying taxes. For example, internal URA records indicate 
that, in the financial years 2012/2013 and 2013/2014, there were 17 government 
organisations that did not remit any taxes. With the establishment of the PSO, these 
organisations started paying taxes.  
 
Our research also reveals that even among those government organisations that were 
paying taxes, there were huge under-declarations. Some were paying as little as UGX 5,000 
(approximately US$ 1.77) per year. Shortly after the PSO was established, revenue 
contributions from public organisations shot up tremendously as evidenced in Figure 6 
below. 
 
  
                                                          
11 For example, previously, some income would be treated as exempt when it was in fact taxable.  
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Figure 6 Annual revenue growth of public sector institutions 
 
Source: URA databases 
 
The PSO is now the second largest contributor to domestic tax collection in Uganda after the 
LTO. It contributed 5 per cent of domestic revenue collection in 2014/15, a figure that had 
increased to 17 per cent by 2016/17 (Table 4). 
 
Table 4 Domestic tax collections by tax office (in billions of Uganda Shillings) 
 % of domestic tax share 
Segments 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17 
LTO 67% 67% 58% 
PSO 5% 10% 17% 
MTO 10% 12% 12% 
STO 18% 12% 12% 
Total domestic tax share 100% 100% 100% 
Source: URA revenue performance reports for 2014/15, 2015/16 and 2016/17. 
 
The PSO has consistently surpassed the revenue targets set for it. As one top URA official 
stated: ‘PSO is actually given a stretched target. We have kept increasing their targets but 
still they surpass them. The revenue collected from these entities is a big surprise to us.’ 
(Interview with management of Domestic Taxes Department.) 
 
4.3 Improved tracing of transactions between government and private sector 
contractors 
 
Government entities are now required to submit a list of all their service providers to the 
URA. This information contains the identification details of the suppliers, the amount of 
money disbursed and the withholding tax deducted, if any. The information is then processed 
by the PSO team and shared with the URA compliance office, who verify whether the 
taxpayers have declared these amounts in their tax returns and take action if there are 
inconsistencies. While we do not have data on the impact of this information sharing on 
revenue collections in other URA offices, it is safe to assume that it has been positive. The 
efficiency of this tracing process has been increased with the introduction of the electronic 
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tax clearance certificate (TCC). For a long time, there was a requirement that any person 
who was going to supply goods or services to government should have a TCC, which would 
indicate that they are tax compliant. However, because the TCC system was manual, it was 
difficult to verify its authenticity. The electronic TCCs are now emailed to both the suppliers 
and the government purchasing organisations. The PSO team sensitises the latter on how to 
verify the authenticity of TCCs online. There are some benefits to the suppliers: faster 
clearance means they are paid more promptly. Finally, the URA can now access information 
from government about all those who bid for government tenders but end up being 
unsuccessful. This has helped enrich the URA’s taxpayer register. 
 
4.4 Increase in compliance by politicians and other influential individuals 
 
In many African countries, one of the most difficult groups to tax is politicians and politically 
connected individuals (McCluskey 2016). A study that was conducted in 2016 on HNWIs in 
Uganda found that politicians constituted a significant percentage of the wealthy individuals 
in the country (Kangave, Nakato, Waiswa and Lumala Zzimbe 2016). An analysis of the tax 
compliance of 71 top government officials over the period 2011/2012 to 2013/2014 found that 
although all of these individuals had stakes in commercial enterprises, the majority were not 
paying personal income taxes. Neither were the companies that they were associated with 
complying with their tax obligations. Since the opening of the VIP unit in the PSO, 
compliance by this group of individuals has significantly improved. For the financial year 
2015/2016, for example, 65 per cent of VIPs on the URA’s register were filing returns 
(Kangave et al. 2018). 
 
 
5  Enabling conditions for the PSO’s success 
 
A combination of factors have enabled the success of the PSO:  
 
a) Strong support for the PSO’s activities within the URA: in addition to having a PSO 
team that is proficient and dedicated, there has been strong institutional support for 
the work of the PSO. In particular, URA senior management has been actively 
involved in the activities of the PSO, with leaders such as the Commissioner General 
and the Commissioner for Domestic Taxes being part of the meetings that the PSO 
team holds with taxpayers. Similarly, the management team of the Domestic Taxes 
Department participates in some of the taxpayer sensitisation activities. Lastly, there 
is good collaboration and coordination of activities between the PSO and other URA 
departments.   
 
b) Successful coordination and collaboration with key government agencies: the PSO is 
able to access budget execution data at an early stage, thereby enabling it to 
determine what tax liability different government organisations are likely to have. 
When the government releases funds to different agencies, the Permanent Secretary 
and Secretary to the Treasury (PSST) notifies the PSO. Once payments have been 
made to these agencies, the Bank of Uganda issues a statement to the PSO for 
analysis. If there are any inconsistencies between the funds that were released and 
the amounts that are subsequently declared in tax returns, the PSO notifies the 
Treasury Department of these inconsistencies.  
 
c) Related to the above is the support and cooperation that the PSO has received from 
high-ranking government officials, particularly the PSST and the Commissioner of 
Local Government Administration. The PSST, for example, issues circulars to 
different ministries, departments and agencies requiring them to comply with their tax 
obligations. Organisations that fail to comply risk missing government budget 
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releases on time. Similarly, the Commissioner of Local Government Administration 
started issuing an updated list of district Chief Administrative Officers (CAOs) to the 
URA. Where the PSO experiences difficulties in dealing with a particular CAO, the 
Commissioner intervenes. For example, there was an instance when one CAO 
refused for his staff to go for a PSO training session unless the URA paid them a per 
diem. The PSO engaged the Commissioner, who wrote the message below to the 
CAO:  
 
 
 
d) Use of ‘soft compliance’ strategies: in addition to the taxpayer sensitisation exercises 
that are undertaken by the PSO on an ongoing basis, the PSO team employs 
alternative compliance mechanisms such as following up with contact persons in 
government organisations through short message service (SMS), emails, phone calls, 
physical visits and slots during workshops. The use of these soft approaches have 
proven to be quite instrumental in improving compliance.   
 
 
6  Challenges faced by the PSO  
 
Despite the success registered by the PSO, it still faces various challenges. 
 
 Limited human resources: the ratio of staff to taxpayers in the PSO is 1:37. While this 
seems more than acceptable by normal URA standards (as the staff to taxpayer ratio 
in the whole organisation was 1:373 in 2015/2016) it is still relatively low for an office 
that deals with large taxpayers such as government organisations (Kangave et al. 
2018). By comparison, the LTO has a staff to taxpayer ratio of 1:8. The staff shortage 
in the PSO is exacerbated by the fact that some of the staff members lack public 
sector accounting skills. Their ability to operate is also constrained by lack of 
sufficient resources (such as laptops and vehicles), which are essential for upcountry 
field visits. 
 Sensitisation workshops for staff of other government agencies: the practice in most 
government agencies in Uganda is to give officials a per diem (daily allowance) to 
attend workshops. The URA does not do this. Consequently, attendance at some of 
the sensitisation workshops is very low.  
 For local governments and town councils that are located in rural areas, compliance 
is undermined by poor internet connections. 
 
 
  
‘Please refer to forwarded email message from URA. I have also tried to call you over the same, but 
you are not picking. It is indicated that your office is not willing to send Officers for the training 
organized by URA in Mpigi unless URA shall pay them subsistence allowances in spite of the failure 
by your district to complete and submit the tax returns. 
I wish to advise that you find means of sending the affected Officers to participate in the training 
which definitely they need instead of insisting on the issue of allowances. Please cooperate and I do 
not need to remind you of the repercussions of failing to do so.’ 
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7  Conclusion 
 
Reforms in tax administration normally focus on increasing compliance among taxpayers in 
the private sector. Yet there is a significant component of intra-government transactions and 
transactions between government and the private sector that are – or should be – subject to 
tax. The compliance behaviour of government organisations is often quite different from that 
of private sector taxpayers. The URA case study demonstrates the benefits that other 
revenue authorities in Africa could accrue from establishing offices that are dedicated 
specifically to managing the tax affairs of public sector entities.   
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